SUMMARY Gaudry has described a new algorithm (Gaudry's variant) for the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in hyperelliptic curves. For a hyperelliptic curve of a small genus on a finite field GF(q), Gaudry's variant solves for the DLP in time O(q 2+ ). This paper shows that C ab curves can be attacked with a modified form of Gaudry's variant and presents the timing results of such attack. However, Gaudry's variant cannot be effective in all of the C ab curve cryptosystems. This paper also provides an example of a C ab curve that is unassailable by Gaudry's variant. key words: discrete logarithm, hyperelliptic curve, superelliptic curve, C ab curve
Introduction
Gaudry [7] has described a new algorithm (Gaudry's variant) for the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in hyperelliptic curves. Gaudry's variant uses the method for Pollard's rho algorithm [12] with the function field sieving algorithm of Adleman,DeMarrais, and Huang [1] . Gaudry's variant solves the DLP in a hyperelliptic curve of a genus g defined on a finite field F q in time O(q 2+ ) when the genus g is sufficiently small in comparison to the order q of the definition field.
Arita [3] and Galbraith et al. [6] described addition algorithms on the Jacobian group of C ab and superelliptic curves respectively, and demonstrated algorithm applications in discrete-log-based public key cryptosystems. This paper shows that C ab and superelliptic curves can be attacked by a modified Gaudry's variant and presents timing results from the attack.
With hyperelliptic or C ab curve cryptosystems, one usually selects a curve of a sufficiently large genus so that definition fields are less than one word in size to hasten computations [3] , [14] . Gaudry's variant has excluded out this conventional hastening method. However, Gaudry's variant cannot be effective in all of the non-elliptic algebraic curve cryptosystems. This paper also provides an example of a C ab curve that is unassailable by Gaudry's variant.
Gaudry's variant
Take a hyperelliptic curve C : y 2 = x 2g+1 + a 1 x 2g + · · · a 2g+1 of genus g defined on a finite filed F q . Sup-
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pose its genus g is sufficiently small in comparison to the order q of the definition field. Let J C denote the Jacobian group of the hyperelliptic curve C. To handle with the DLP, we look for an integer λ that satisfies
In Pollard's rho algorithm, we calculate random linear sums
and D 2 step by step through a random walk, and wait for a collision
In Gaudry's variant [7] , just as in the case of rho algorithm, we calculate random linear sums
However, we gather smooth R i value's instead of waiting for a collision. An element D in J C is called smooth when D is a sum of F q rational points on C. Let all of the F q rational points on C be {P 1 , P 2 , ..., P w },where the number w is approximately equal to q. Then, every smooth R i corresponds to a w-dimensional
from Cantor's algorithm [4] , R i is smooth if and only if the polynomial u i (x) is factored into the linear product k (x−c k ) over F q , and then we get
Therefore, by calculating all of the F q rational points {P 1 , P 2 , · · · , P w } in advance at a complexity of O(q), the vector M i is easily obtained.
When g is sufficiently small in comparison to q, about 1/g! of all of the elements in J C are smooth ( [7] Prop.4). So, we obtain w ( > = w) 
These values for γ i produce λ through the equation
In Gaudry's variant, the most complex step is solving the w-dimensional linear equation So, the effect of automorphisms can be ignored by expanding the size of the definition field with log 2 (84(g − 1)) more bits.
C ab and superelliptic curves
A C ab curve is a nonsingular affine curve with the equation
where both α b,0 and α 0,a are not equal to zero [10] . Arita [3] described an addition algorithm for the Jacobian group of a C ab curve in terms of ideals of the coordinate ring, aiming at cryptosystems using C ab curves. For a C ab curve with 160 bits of a Jacobian group, timing results from the addition algorithm are listed in Tables 1,2 , and 3. In the tables, "simple" denotes a C ab curve with a equation of the form Y a + αX b + β, and "random" denotes a randomly chosen C ab curve. "Sum", "double", and "scalar" denote addition, doubling, and scalar multiplication of random elements, respectively.
A superelliptic curve is a nonsingular affine curve of the equation
where n is prime to the characteristics of the definition field, and n and δ are prime to each other [6] . Galbraith et al. [6] described an addition algorithm in the Jacobian group of a superelliptic curve in terms of lattice computations. Given these definitions, C ab curves clearly include superelliptic curves. Only C ab curves will be examined.
Application of Gaudry's variant to C ab curves
We modify Gaudry's variant to apply it to C ab curves. The problems we encounter are how to decide if a given element in a Jacobian group is smooth or not, and, if it is, how to represent it as a sum of F q rational points. Note that about 1/g! of all of the elements in J C are smooth when g is sufficiently small just as in the case of hyperelliptic curves (See the proof of [7] Prop.4). For example, take a C 37 curve. The genus is six. An element R in the Jacobian group of C 37 curve is expressed as an ideal of the coordinate ring. The ideal has the following form of Gröbner basis with respect to the C 37 order [3] :
Here, a i , b i , and c i are elements in the definition field. The common zeroes of these three equations are six points on the C 37 curve, that comprise R. When the definition field F q is large enough, the six points comprising R have distinct x-coordinates to each other for almost any R in the Jacobian group. So, almost any R can be expressed as common zeroes of two polynomials: R = {sixth degree polynomial of x, y + (fifth degree polynomial of x)}, just as in the case of hyperelliptic curves. The expression is nothing but the Gröbner basis of (the ideal corresponding to) R with respect to the lexicographic order. Therefore, in Gaudry's variant against C ab curves, for almost any R i , the decision regarding the R i value's smoothness and representation as a sum of F q rational points follows the same pattern as for hyperelliptic curves, after translating the Gröbner basis of R i w.r.t.
C ab order to another Gröbner basis w.r.t. lexicographic order. It is well known that Gröbner bases can be effectively translated between distinct monomial orders. Note that if exceptional values for R i are found, we can simply discard them. Thus, now we know that Gaudry's variant can also be applied to C ab curves. Table 4 93 bits of a C 37 curve over 17 bits of a prime field
We implemented the modified Gaudry's variant with C language and the PARI-GP [11] , and then tested it against the C 37 curve in Table 4 . The curve has 93 bits of a Jacobian group over 17 bits of a prime field. Let ζ 3 and ζ 7 denote the primitive third and the seventh root of unity, respectively. Since the curve has the automorphism φ(x, y) = (ζ 7 x, ζ 3 y) of order 21, the number of the orbits of φ on the rational points should be 84211/21 = 4010. · · · or more. We needed to collect 4011 or more smooth elements and then solve about 4011 dimensional sparse linear equations. For solving these linear equations, we also used the Lanczos algorithm [9] .
Two elements D 1 and D 2 in the Jacobian group were randomly generated: for D 2 = λD 1 in the time given in Table 5 . The average and variance of the number of steps needed to produce a smooth element were 848.265 and 680786, respectively, reasonable results compared to Gaudry's theoretical estimate 1/6! = 1/720 of the probability for an element to be smooth [7] . Table 5 Timing results of modified Gaudry's variant against the C 37 curve from Table 4 using a 266-MHz Pentium II chip.
C ab curves that are unassailable by Gaudry's variant
Let a and b be distinct prime numbers. Let C(p, α, β)(= C (p, a, b, α, β) ) denote a C ab curve over a prime field F p with the equation
In this section, we will construct a C ab curve C(p, α, β) of a small genus, that is secure against Gaudry's variant. Let h be the order of the Jacobian group of C(p, α, β). Conditions for security are:
Condition 1
The order h has 160 or more bits of prime factor l [12] ,
Condition 3 l is not equal to p [13] , and Condition 4 p has (40 + log 2 (84(g − 1))) or more bits.
The fourth condition secures a curve against Gaudry's variant (Theorem 1). Because we are handling a curve with a small genus, we do not need to consider Adleman,DeMarrais,and Huang's algorithm [1] or its extension to superelliptic curves [6] .
Koblitz [8] used Jacobi sums to calculate the order of Jacobian groups of hyperelliptic curves. Jacobi sums can also be used for a curve C(p, α, β). For simplicity, p ≡ 1 (mod lcm(a, b) ) has been assumed.
Fix the generator w of the multiplicative group F * p . For a rational number s such that (p − 1)s is an integer, character χ s of F * p is defined by
Extend χ s to the whole F p by setting χ s (0) = 0 when s is not an integer and setting χ s (0) = 1 when it is. For integers l = 1, 2, . . . , a−1 and m = 1, 2, . . . , b− 1,
is called a Jacobi sum. Here, v 1 and v 2 run over F p under the condition 1 + v 1 + v 2 = 0.
Weil [16] has demonstrated that the L-polynomial L p (U ) of C(p, α, β) can be expressed by Jacobi sums:
where χ s denotes the complex conjugate of χ s .
Generally, the order of a Jacobian group of a curve is equal to the value of the L-polynomial L(U ) of the curve at U = 1 [15] , so the order h of the Jacobian group of C(p, α, β) is given by 
Thus, to know the order h of the Jacobian group, it is sufficient to know the values of the Jacobi sums j p (l, m). However, direct computation of those values using the formula (1) are infeasible from the computational point of view. We use the Stickelberger element to know the values of the Jacobi sums j p (l, m).
Let [λ] denote the largest integer under the rational number λ, and < λ > denote λ− [λ] . Take a cyclotomic field Q(ζ) with a primitive ab-th root ζ of unity. Let
where t runs over reduced residue classes mod ab, is called a Stickelberger element. As an ideal of Q(ζ), it is known that
where P denotes a prime ideal of Q(ζ) lying over p [17] . Suppose that the prime ideal P is principal:
Then, we have
From this, we know that j p (l, m) and γ ω(a,b) differ by the product of some unit of Q(ζ). Moreover, j p (l, m) and γ ω(a,b) has the same absolute value p 1/2 in any embedding into the complex number field [17] . So, j p (l, m) and γ ω(a,b) differ only by the power of −ζ. Now we see that Equation (5) can be used to determine j p (l, m) up to the power of −ζ by knowing the prime p and the principal prime ideal P = (γ) in advance.
We arrive at the following algorithms: Algorithm 1 (Search for a secure C(p, α, β)): Input: a, b Output: p, α, β, and the order h of the Jacobian group
n denotes the least integer over n.
3. Search the candidate j for the value of a Jacobi sum for some prime p of m or more bits by using Algorithm 2:
(p, j) ← Algorithm2(m). − 1) ) or more bits, so the curve obtained by Algorithm 1 is secure against Gaudry's variant. At step 6, we check only the necessary condition for the group order to be h. So strictly the order may be different from h. But, the test at step 6 ensures that the order has the same large prime factor l as the one of h. This is sufficient for our purpose.
For every
Algorithm 2, contained in Algorithm 1, makes use of Equation (3) and (5) for the Stickelberger element to find the candidate value of the Jacobi sum. Algorithm 2 (Finding the candidate of the Jacobi sum): Input: m Output: p and j
3. For every i = 1, 2, . . ., mod lcm(a, b) ), because the prime ideal (γ) has the residue degree one over the prime p.
Experimentally, we observed that numbers of repeating steps 2 and 3 depends heavily on the range of c l at step 2. We take the range −20 < = c l < = 20, so that Algorithm 2 stops after repeating steps 2 and 3 for several times, for the input m of the size used in the real world.
Example Algorithm 1 was run for a = 3 and b = 5. 
6 − 16ζ 7 was randomly generated.
6 − 16ζ 7 , p ← Norm(γ) = 581929936583251 is a prime of 50 bits. Now, the candidate value j of the Jacobi sum for p is j ← γγ (7) γ (11) γ (13) = 18682331 + 1900434ζ + 3903200ζ 
Conclusion
We demonstrated that C ab and superelliptic curves can be attacked by a modified Gaudry's variant, and reported timing results for the attack. However, Gaudry's variant cannot be effective in all of the non-elliptic algebraic curve cryptosystems. We provided an example of a C 35 curve that is unassailable by Gaudry's variant.
